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I. National and Supranational Antitrust Law
On October 10, 1990, Italy joined the other members of the European Com-
munity (EC) by enacting its first antitrust legislation, entitled Norms for the Pro-
tection of Competition and the Market. 1 Both the activity of European unification
and the existing division of jurisdiction between the antitrust law of the European
Economic Community (Community or EEC) and that of its Member States could
cause this new legislation to see most action in the area of mergers and acqui-
sitions. The Treaty of Rome provides that Community antitrust law applies to
activities that "affect trade between the Member States," leaving national law to
regulate purely intrastate activity.2 However, just as the United States has de-
veloped a broad interpretation of the commerce clause of the United States Con-
stitution,3 this provision of the Treaty of Rome is understood to include "virtually
any practice which brings about some noticeable effect on market conditions or
*A.B., 1980, Syracuse University; Ph.D., 1985, S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo; J.D., 1989, Georgetown
University Law Center.
1. Italian Antitrust Law of Oct. 10, 1990, n.287, Norms for the Protection of Competition and
the Market [Norme per la tutela della concorrenza e del mercato], 240 Gazzetta Ufficiale della
Repubblica Italiana [Gazz. Uff.] 3 (Oct. 13, 1990) [hereinafter Italian Antitrust Law]. Page refer-
ences are to the Italian Official Gazette with each citation. All quotations from this law are in English
as translated by the author and M. Emanuela Galanti. The Senate report accompanying the proposal
for this law pointed out that "Italy is still today, together with Turkey, the only member of the
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-OECD] in which competition is not
protected by law." RELAZIONE DELLA IOA COMMISSIONE PERMANENTE nn. 1240 e 1012-A, at 3 (1989).
2. Treaty Establishing the European Community, March 25, 1957, arts. 85(1), 298 U.N.T.S.
11, 48 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
3. "The Congress shall have [the] Power . . . to regulate Commerce . . .among the several
States .... U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 1, 3. For a discussion of the powers of United States
Congress under the commerce clause, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
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structures and involves undertakings of a size above the level affected by the
current Notice" of the European Commission on competition policy.
4
This broad jurisdiction is not found in the Community's Merger Regulation,
enacted on December 21, 1989, which strictly limits the scope of Community
law by setting a high, minimum size for the undertakings conducting transactions
to which it applies.5 If the companies involved fall under this very high limit,
national law will control the merger, even if the merger brings together compa-
nies from different Member States. Thus, the antitrust law of each Member State
can be expected to evaluate, prohibit, or permit a large share of the mergers
leading the European market gradually to overcome the effects of national bor-
ders. This makes the introduction of an antitrust law into a country like Italy-
which has never had antitrust legislation outside of very limited areas-both
interesting and challenging.
6
In most cases, national and supranational laws should regulate merger activ-
ities on two separate levels according to the size of the transaction. These levels
will have three points of possible, shared jurisdiction. Any transaction will thus
be initially located on the regulatory level of either Community or national law,
but contain the possibility of being affected by the other. A merger will come
under national jurisdiction if worldwide turnover of all the companies involved
is less than five billion ECU, no two companies in the transaction have an
EC-wide turnover of more than 250 million ECU each, or each of the companies
involved earns two-thirds of its Community-wide turnover within a single Mem-
4. D. G GOYDER, EEC COMPETITION LAW 105 (1988) (referring to article 85(1) of the Treaty of
Rome). On article 86 cases, the European Court of Justice said:
When an undertaking in a dominant position within the Common Market is likely to be eliminated, it does not
matter whether the conflict relates to the latter's exports or its trade within the Common Market, once it has been
established that this elimination will have repercussions on the competitive structure within the Common Market.
IVA VAN BAEL & JEAN FRANCOIS BELLAS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMU-
NITY 4-10 (1990 ed.) (quoting Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and
Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R. 223, 252-53, [1974 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8209 (1974)).
5. The Regulation applies only to concentrations with a "Community dimension," which is
defined as:
a. the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than ECU 5[,1000 million, and
b. the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than ECU
250 million,
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide
turnover within one and the same Member State.
Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations Between Un-
dertakings, art. 1(2), 32 O.J. (L 395) 1, 3 (1989) [hereinafter Merger Regulation].
6. As one authority states:
1. Except in the area of newspaper publishing, Italy has no anti-trust laws and therefore mergers having no effect
on trade among the Member States are generally not subject to any direct anti-trust scrutiny in Italy.
2. On the other hand, even leaving aside corporate law controls, there are several Italian law provisions affecting
mergers: the major regulated industries, such as banking and insurance, are a notable example thereof.
3. Furthermore, one should consider that large segments of the Italian economy are owned or controlled by the
state and mergers involving state owned or controlled companies are variously subject to governmental control and
approval.
MAGRONE, GORLA, PASINETrn, BROSIO & CASATI, MERGER CONTROL IN THE EEC I II (1988).
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ber State.7 This high minimum revenue for the application of the Community's
merger regulation might be lowered when the provision is examined for possible
revision in 1993.8 At the present time all transactions below this level come
under the sole jurisdiction of national law, with one exception. If a Member State
chooses to refer a case to the Commission's review, the Commission may take
jurisdiction, provided that the merger "affects trade between the Member
States." 9 This provision allows the Member State to place merger analysis back
into the broad, Community jurisdiction practiced under articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty of Rome,' 0 and is the only case where such jurisdiction can pass from the
Member State to the Community.
Jurisdiction can pass in the other direction, from the Community to the Mem-
ber State, in two circumstances. First, if a merger affects a "distinct market"
within a Member State, where the patterns of supply and competition are ho-
mogeneous enough to separate that market from other areas, the Member State
may inform the Commission, which may decide to retain jurisdiction or refer the
case to the Member State."' Second, even if the Commission decides to retain
jurisdiction, the Member State may, regardless of the Commission's final deci-
sion, take "appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests," such as
"[p]ublic security, plurality of the media, and prudential rules."' 2 The presence
of "distinct markets" and Member State actions to protect national interests will
therefore create an overlap between the single Community Merger Regulation
and the twelve Member State jurisdictions. The space of this overlap will no
doubt become more distinct as Commission decisions firm up the margins of the
various definitions.
If the revenue of the companies involved in a transaction is below the Merger
Regulation's minimum revenue and the Member State does not refer the case
to the Commission, it will fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the Member
State-even if it does not affect a "distinct market" or "national interests."
The following comments discuss the newly enacted Italian antitrust legislation
in this context, emphasizing its conformity to Community standards and
probing the areas where it differs from those standards. Any lasting differ-
ences will create the possibility of divergent treatment for mergers above and
below the Merger Regulation's cutoff point, and thus an incentive to place the
merger under national or Community law in order to take advantage of those
differences.
7. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, art. 1, 32 O.J. at 3.
8. Id.
9. Id. art. 22(3), 32 O.J. at 11.
10. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
11. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, art. 9, 32 O.J. at 7.
12. Id. art. 21(3), 32 O.J. at 11.
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II. The Italian Antitrust Law, "Norms for the
Protection of Competition and the Market"
Italy adopted its antitrust legislation, Norms for the Protection of Competition
and the Market, on October 10, 1990; the law went into force the following
day. 13 This compact law covers agreements that restrict trade,1 4 abuses of a
dominant or monopoly position, 15 and mergers, 16 as well as providing for the
regulation of these activities in the context of credit institutions, 17 insurance
companies,IS publishing, and broadcasting.' 9 The Italian law addresses the same
types of transactions and activities as the Community's antitrust law and Merger
Regulation, but applies only to those transactions and activities "that do not fall
under the ambit of application" of Community law.2 0 It thus offers a near-mirror
image of Community law, but on a lower level of international activity and
revenue for the companies involved.
When addressing mergers, the Italian law would thus provide jurisdiction for
transactions falling below the Community's floor of a required, minimum turn-
over, and above its own floor requirement of 500 billion lire for the annual
turnover of all of the companies involved in the transaction, or 50 billion lire for
the annual turnover of the company to be acquired.2 ' If either of these criteria is
met, the transaction must be reported to the Authority Guarding Competition and
the Market (Authority).22 Because both the Merger Regulation and the Italian
law use as a determining factor the total turnover of all the companies partici-
pating in a transaction, the difference between these two figures can give us an
idea of the range of the Italian law: the Italian law will apply when the turnover
of all of the participating companies is below five billion and above 420 million
ECU (assuming a 1,200 lire per ECU rate of exchange). This is a range of 4.58
billion ECU, and at the top of it, the transactions under the Italian law could be
substantial. In this large band a new law with a completely new agency to
administer it will discipline competition in a market that has never been subjected
to antitrust regulation.
23
13. Italian Antitrust Law art. 34, 240 Gazz. Uff. at 11.
14. Id. art. 2, 240 Gazz. Uff. at 3.
15. Id. art. 3, 240 Gazz. Uff. at 3.
16. Id. arts. 5-6, 240 Gazz. Uff. at 4.
17. Id. arts. 20, 27-30, 240 Gazz. Uff. at 8, 9-11.
18. Id. art. 20, 240 Gazz. Uff. at 8.
19. Id.
20. Id. art. 1(1), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 3.
21. Id. art. 16(1), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 6-7. Assuming a dollar/lira exchange of 1:1,200, the Italian
law would cover transactions where the turnover within Italy for all the interested companies is more
than $420 million, or the turnover of the target company is more than $42 million. See supra note
5 in order to compare this to the Community floor, which would serve as the Italian law's ceiling.
22. Italian Antitrust Law art. 16, 240 Gazz. Uff. at 6-7. For a discussion of the Authority, see
infra note 24 and accompanying text.
23. The Senate Report points out the less-than-open structure of the present Italian market: -[l]n
thirteen manufacturing sectors, the first four companies hold more than 75 percent gross internal
revenue." RELAZIONE DELA IOA COMMISSIONE PERMANENTE nn. 1240 e 1012-A, at 3 (1989). Active
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A. THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY
The Italian antitrust law has created a new agency, the Authority Guarding
Competition and the Market, to administer antitrust supervision. 24 This Author-
ity will have investigative and decision-making autonomy, 25 and be funded
through its own provision in the budget for the Ministry of Industry, Commerce,
and Craftsmanship. 26 It will consist of a president and four members chosen from
among distinguished judges, jurists, and economists, 27 each appointed for a
nonrenewable term of seven years. 28 The Authority will have a staff of 150
persons, plus 50 additional persons on a separate, contract basis. 29 All personnel
working for the Authority will be barred from taking other positions or perform-
ing any consulting or other commercial activity. 30 The Authority's decisions may
be appealed to the regional administrative court of Lazio, and will be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative judge. 31
B. THE AUTHORITY'S INVESTIGATIVE AND JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
The authority will have a judicial, an investigative, and a consultive capacity.
It will hear arguments and decide on whether to permit specific concentrations,32
investigate the existing law and economy for evidence of possible anticompeti-
tive measures or practices, 33 and remain available as a consultant to the Gov-
ernment on the competition aspects of legislation and regulations under consid-
34eration.
When a merger agreement is notified to the Authority, the latter has 120 days
to investigate the agreement and reach a decision on the merits. 35 If the Authority
issues no decision within 120 days, the agreement is deemed to be approved,
unless the initial notification contained false or incomplete information. 36 Once
a party or other source has given official notice of a proposed, completed, or
ongoing merger, the Authority has 30 days within which to initiate an investi-
gation, 37 and 45 days from the date of this initiation to publish its decision, with
enforcement of the antitrust law would have great impact without even trying to be aggressive, and
could result in a substantial reformation of the Italian economy.
24. Italian Antitrust Law art. 10, 240 Gazz. Uff. at 5 (the agency's name in Italian is Autorita
garante della concorrenza e del mercato).
25. Id. art. 10(2), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 5.
26. Id. art. 10(7), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 5.
27. Id. art. 10(2), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 5.
28. Id. art. 10(3), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 5.
29. Id. art. 11(1), (4), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 5.
30. Id. art. 11(3), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 5.
31. Id. art. 33(1), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 11.
32. Id. art. 12(1), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 6.
33. Id. art. 21, 240 Gazz. Uff. at 8.
34. Id. art. 22, 240 Gazz. Uff. at 8.
35. Id. art. 4(1), (3), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 4.
36. Id. art. 13, 240 Gazz. Uff. at 6.
37. Id. art. 16(4), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 7.
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the possibility of extending this period by an additional 30 days if the companies
do not fully cooperate in providing information and data. 38 This timetable easily
complies with the four-month period within which Member States must publish
the results of cases referred to them by the Commission under the Merger Reg-
ulation's "distinct market" exception .39 The Authority has only 15 days to initiate
the investigation of a tender offer,'4 and must publish its decision not to investigate
a routinely notified merger within 30 days of notification. 4 1 The Authority may
initiate an investigation after these time limits have lapsed if the parties' notifi-
cation was incomplete or "gravely inexact" [gravemente inessatte].42
The Authority can ask all interested parties to furnish relevant information,
and to make their files available to officials for inspecting and copying of doc-
uments. 43 All information and documents that are released or copied are pro-
tected by "official secrecy" [segreto d'ufficio]. 44 The Authority is required to
give all interested parties a chance to be heard at "every stage of the inquiry,"
including the inquiry's close.45
C. ITALIAN COMPETITION LAW Is BASED ON COMMUNITY STANDARDS
The questions investigated and the standards applied to decide whether an
agreement or concentration will be approved are nearly identical to those applied
by the Commission under Community law. The list of agreements between
undertakings that are prohibited by article 2 of the Italian law differs from the
definition given in article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome only in that it does not
include concerted practices.4 6 The standard against which these agreements are
measured-whether they have "as their object or effect the prevention, restric-
tion or distortion, in a consistent manner, within the national market or in a
relevant part of it"-differs from article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome only by
including the requirement of a "consistent manner." 47 At this point it would be
38. Id. art. 16(8), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 7.
39. Merger Regulation, supra note 5, art. 9(6), 32 O.J. at 7 (1990).
40. Italian Antitrust Law art. 16(5), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 7.
41. Id. art. 16(4), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 7.
42. Id. art. 16(7), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 7.
43. Id. art. 14(2), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 6.
44. Id. art. 14(3), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 6.
45. Id. art. 14(1), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 6.
46. The Italian law defines "agreements" as "accords and/or practical arrangements between
enterprises, as well as the deliberations of consortiums, trade associations, and other such organi-
zations, even if adopted in accordance with the provision of statute or regulation." Id. art. 2, 240
Gazz. Uff. at 3.
The Treaty of Rome includes "agreements" and "decisions by associations of enterprises and any
concerted practices which are likely to affect trade between the Member States. ... Treaty of
Rome, supra note 2, art. 85(1), 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-48.
47. The following presents the relevant section of the Italian law. (Wording not included in the
Treaty has been italicized. Treaty wording not included in the Italian Law has been inserted in
brackets. Insubstantial differences in phrasing have not been indicated.)
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difficult to estimate what length of time would sufficiently establish a "consistent
manner," but, if the Authority found it to require a steady trend of substantial
duration, this could present an incentive to have an agreement reviewed under the
Italian rather than the Community law.
The Italian law defines "abuse of a dominant position" with a near-verbatim
transcription of article 86 of the Treaty of Rome,4 8 and makes only one signif-
icant deviation from the Merger Regulation in the criteria used to evaluate
whether a merger "constitute[s] or strengthen[s] a dominant position. ' 49 The
Italian law differs by not including consideration of "the interests of the inter-
mediate and ultimate consumers" in evaluating the effects of market domi-
nance. 50 This consideration could at least partially be covered by the inclusion
of the interests of "users" in the Italian law, 5' but may also indicate a desire to
keep antitrust issues at the level of industrial policy and away from the economic
touchstone of the "consumer good." This, and the criterion of "international
Agreements between enterprises are prohibited if they have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion, in a consistent manner, of the play of competition within the (Common] national market or in a relevant
part of it. and also through activities that:
a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
b) limit or control production, openings or access to the market, investments, technical development or techno-
logical progress;
c) share markets or sources of supply;
d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage;
e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which,
by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Italian Antitrust Law art. 2(2), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 3; Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 85(1), 298
U.N.T.S. at 47-48.
48. According to the relevant provisions of the Italian Antitrust Law and the Treaty of Rome, it
is a prohibited abuse of a dominant position to:
a) directly or indirectly impose unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
b) impede or limit production, opening or access to the market, technical development or technological progress
to the prejudice of consumers;
c) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage;
d) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which,
by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Italian Antitrust Law art. 3, 240 Gazz. Uff. at 3; Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S.
at 48-49. (Wording not included in the Treaty of Rome has been italicized. Treaty wording not
included in the Italian law has been inserted in brackets. Insubstantial differences in phrasing have
not been indicated.)
49. To evaluate whether a concentration constitutes or strengthens a dominant position, the
Authority will examine:
[tie possible choices available to suppliers and users, the market position of the interested undertakings [and their
economic and financial power), their access to sources of supplies or to the openings in the market, the structure
of the market, the competitive situation of national industry [actual or potential competition from undertakings
located either within or without the Community], [legal or otherl barriers to entering the market for competing
enterprises, as well as the course of supply and demand of the products or services in question.
Italian Antitrust Law art. 6(1), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 4; Merger Regulation, supra note 5, art. 2(1), 32
O.J. at 3. (Wording not included in the Merger Regulation has been italicized. Regulation wording
not included in the Italian law has been inserted in brackets. Insubstantial differences in phrasing have
not been indicated.) The Italian law also fails the include "the interests of intermediate and ultimate
consumers." See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
50. "In making this appraisal [of concentrations], the Commission shall take into account ....
the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers. ... Merger Regulation, supra note 5,
art. 2(1), 32 O.J. at 3.
51. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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competitiveness" discussed below, 52 could be a result of the Italian law's being
introduced into an economy where, in thirteen industrial sectors, the largest
four firms control 75 percent of output, 53 and of the Italian Government's desire
to avoid shocking its economy with a flurry of consumer-oriented antitrust
activity.
The control of another company requisite for establishing a concentration is
defined using the Community standard of "decisive influence" [influenza deter-
minante] over the controlled company. 54 Neither law counts shares purchased by
a bank or other financial institution for resale as controlling holdings in the
company from which they are purchased.55 However, the Merger Regulation
allows these shares to be voted in preparation for their resale, which must take
place within one year of purchase, and the Italian law prohibits their voting, but
allows the financial institution to hold them for two years before resale.56
While the Italian law grants exemptions from the prohibitions of agreements
restricting trade or pricing according to criteria very similar to those provided by
article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome, 57 it also includes the criterion of interna-
52. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
54. 1. For the purposes of the present article, one has control in those cases contemplated by
Article 2359 of the Civil Code, or else through rights, contracts or other legal relationships that
confer, either alone or together, when taking into account the legal and factual circumstances, the
possibility of exercising a decisive influence on the activity of an enterprise, also by:
a) Ownership or the ight to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking,
b) Rights. contracts, or other legal relationships that confer decisive influence on the composition, deliberations
(voting), or decisions of the organs of an enterprise.
2. Control is acquired by the person or enterprise or by the group of persons or enterprises:
a) who are the holders of rights or the beneficiaries of the contracts or parties to other legal relationships listed
above,
b) who, while not being holders of such rights, beneficiaries of such contracts, or parties to such legal relationships
have the power to exercise the rights deriving therefrom
Italian Antitrust Law art. 7, 240 Gazz. Uff. at 4; Merger Regulation, supra note 5, art. 3(3)-(4).
(Wording not included in the Merger Regulation has been italicized. Regulation wording not included
in the Italian law has been inserted in brackets. Insubstantial differences in phrasing have not been
indicated.) Article 2359 of the Italian Civil Code defines a "controlled corporation" as one over
which another corporation has control by virtue of either (a) a majority shareholding, (b) a dominant
shareholding or other tie giving the same effect, or (c) through a controlled subsidiary that controls
the corporation in question.
55. Italian Antitrust Law art. 5(2), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 4; Merger Regulation, supra note 5, art.
3(5)(a), 32 O.J. at 4.
56. The Merger Regulation provides:
A concentration shall not be deemed to arise where . . .credit institutions or other financial institutions or
insurance companies ... hold on a temporary basis securities which they have acquired in an undertaking with a
view to reselling them, provided that they do not exercise voting ights in respect of those securities with a view
to determining the competitive behaviour of that undertaking or provided that they exercise such voting rights only
with a view to preparing the sale of all or part of that undertaking or of its assets or the sale of those securities
and that any such sale takes place within one year .... (emphasis added).
Merger Regulation, supra note 5, art. 3(5)(a), 32 O.J. at 4. The Italian law provides that:
The acquisition of control by a bank or a financial institution at the time of constitution of an enterprise or at the
time of an increase in the latter's capital will not give rise to a concentration, provided the shares were purchased
with a view to their resale on the market, and that during the period they are held, not to exceed two years, the
shares are not voted. (emphasis added)
Italian Antitrust Law art. 5(2), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 4.
57. The Authority may authorize, with the proper precautions and for a limited period, agreements or categories of
agreements prohibited by Article 2 if these agreements create an improvement in the conditions of [production or]
market supply and have the effect of substantially benefiting consumers, and if the exemptions are granted taking
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tional competitiveness that is playing an important role in the Commission's
administration of the Merger Regulation. 58 The criterion of international com-
petitiveness could play a significant role in the administration of the statute. As
Areeda and Turner point out, "One cannot judge the possible consequences of a
merger of two competitors without knowing their respective importance in their
market." 59 The test for international competitiveness turns what would otherwise
be a study of market power within Italy or a part of Italy into an investigation of
worldwide market power. If a merged firm dominates the Italian market and yet
is small when viewed from an international perspective, the argument can be
made that the merger must be permitted to create a viable "national champion"
in Italy. If Italy, and the Community as a whole, change market definition to
create such champions, it could spur something like a "race to the bottom"6 of
antitrust law in which each country would act to match the corporate size in the
country with the laxest enforcement.
Questions of jurisdiction and police power between the Community and the
Member States are thus not the only problems created by this two-tiered system
of law. Its attempt to overcome the legal and economic obstacles of national
borders makes it increasingly difficult to define markets through the use of such
borders. The development and possible expansion of this doctrine of "interna-
tional competitiveness" in Italy could work to undermine the regulatory strength
of the new antitrust law. At its worst, the widespread application of this exception
could lead to a definition of the relevant market as that including all international
competition, perhaps admitting and ignoring abusive dominance at home for the
sake of combating larger industrial blocks abroad.6 '
into account the need for guaranteeing that enterprises are competitive at the international level, especially
regarding qualitative and quantitative increases in production, improvements in distribution, and technical and
technological progress. However, exemptions may not be granted for restrictions that are not strictly necessary to
achieve the goals listed in this paragraph or that result in eliminating competition in a substantial part of the market.
Italian Antitrust Law art. 4(l), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 3-4; Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 85(3), 298
U.N.T.S. at 48. (Wording not included in the Treaty of Rome has been underlined. Treaty wording
not included in the Italian law has been inserted in brackets. Insubstantial differences in phrasing have
not been indicated.)
58. The Director of the Commission's Merger Task force, H. Colin Overbury, has said that the
Commission is making international competitiveness a consideration, and that the merger of the
Volvo and Renault truck and bus divisions took into account the competitiveness of the resulting firm
when weighing the large market concentrations that would result from the merger, and approved the
concentration. 1992-THE EXTERNAL IMPAcT OF EUR. UNIFICATION, Apr. 19, 1991, at 10 (BNA).
59. 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 346 (1978).
60. The reference is to Professor Cary's argument that American corporations gravitate to the
state where management has the most freedom, and thus the various states race to loosen their laws
even more than their neighbors, in order to entice corporate investment. William L. Cary, Federalism
and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974).
61. In the context of antidumping investigations United States International Trade Commissioner
Ronald Cass has made the argument that such an ability to control prices at home is a characteristic
of corporations that are able to dump, or sell at a lower price abroad than at home, because of their
home market power. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, 3.5" MICRODISKS AND MEDIA THEREFOR FROM JAPAN
77-78 (1988) (distributed to libraries in microfiche) (Commission determination in investigation
no. 731-TA-389 (preliminary) under Tariff Act of 1930). The "international competitiveness" ex-
ception to the enforcement of antitrust law would help create such "national champion" corporations
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On the whole, however, because the Italian law duplicates so many of the
relevant standards developed and applied by the Commission, it can be expected
to track and develop with Community antitrust doctrine. This could make its
application much more regular and dependable than might otherwise occur.
Differences, like Italy's exclusion of "concerted practices" from its definition of
competition-restricting agreements, will certainly make the range of application
somewhat different. The criterion of international competitiveness may also be
applied with more zeal in Rome than in Brussels. On the whole, however, a
merger in Italy could be expected to take place under standards very similar to
those that would control if the transaction had a "Community dimension," and
was monitored by the Commission.
D. ITALIAN REMEDIES AND ENFORCEMENT
The Authority has a number of powers with which it can enforce decisions and
facilitate investigations. It has been given ample powers of discovery for fact-
finding during its judicial inquiry: If interested parties fail to supply requested
information, they are subject to a fine of up to 50 million lire, and if they falsify
such information, they are subject to a fine of up to 100 million lire.62 In the case
of application for a holding in a credit entity, if the application for authorization
omits or falsifies information, the officers, directors and partners of the applying
company can be punished by imprisonment of between one and five years and a
fine of between four and 20 million lire.63
If, upon investigation, the Authority finds that an agreement restricts compe-
tition, the latter is "completely void '64 unless an exemption is granted. 65 This
exemption may be revoked if it is abused, or the facts upon which it is based
change.66 If, when the Authority receives notice of a proposed merger, it finds
the merger "susceptible of being prohibited" as anticompetitive, it can suspend
the merger for the duration of the investigation. 67 If the merger has already taken
place, the Authority may take steps that probably include an ordered divestiture,
to "restore the conditions of effective competition to the market." 68 If a properly
notified merger is found to create a dominant position that eliminates or reduces
competition on the national market, the Authority may block the transaction or
prescribe alterations to eliminate the anticompetitive effects. 69 If the interested
which would then be capable of using high prices at home to subsidize losses abroad as they work
to gain market share. Thus, this exception, while helping the country's international competitiveness,
could have the latent effect of encouraging dumping.
62. Italian Antitrust Law art. 14(5), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 6.
63. Id. art. 29(3), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 11.
64. Id. art. 2(3), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 3.
65. Id. art. 4, 240 Gazz. Uff. at 3-4.
66. Id. art. 4(2), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 4.
67. Id. arts. 16(4), 17(1), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 7.
68. Id. art. 18(3), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 7.
69. Id. art. 6, 240 Gazz. Uff. at 4.
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parties do not comply with orders or sanctions imposed by the Authority, the law
provides for further monetary sanctions and even gives the Authority the power
to close a disobedient party's company for a period of thirty days.
70
E. SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND THE MEDIA
The law also provides for specific sectors already under the supervision of a
specialized government agency. For the insurance sector, the Authority retains its
control over antitrust and merger supervision, but is required to consult and
receive the opinion of the Institute for the Supervision of Private Insurance
and Collective Interests before taking action. 7' In the areas of broadcasting and
publishing, the Authority cedes its control over agreements, monopolies, and
mergers to the agencies charged with regulating those sectors, and these agencies
administer the antitrust law in their limited area just as if they were the Author-
ity.72 The Authority retains the power to alert these regulatory agencies of any
agreements, dominant positions, and mergers that might violate the law,7 3 and
each agency retains power over those sectors "belonging to its competence.' 
74
In the area of credit institutions and companies the law provides a more
complex treatment. First, it grants the agencies charged with regulating the
financial sector full power over antitrust matters, to be executed under the pro-
visions of the antitrust law. Then it adds special provisions that supplement and
amend previous sections as they apply to holdings in credit institutions. Any
holding of more than 5 percent or that gives control of the credit entity must be
reported to the Bank of Italy. 76 Control is assumed from a holding of more than
25 percent of a privately held and more than 10 percent of a publicly held
institution unless another shareholder has a larger block.77 Any holding between
1 and 5 percent of the stock of a credit entity must be reported by mail to the
Bank of Italy, 78 and if a shareholder has over 5 percent of the company's stock,
any increase or decrease of 2 percent in his or her holding must be reported.79
If a party plans to transfer control of an entity, the Bank of Italy must be notified
before the transfer takes place 80 A credit entity may not hold more than 15
70. Id. arts. 15, 19, 240 Gazz. Uff. at 6-7.
71. Id. art. 20(4), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 8.
72. Id. art. 20(1), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 8.
73. Id. art. 20(6), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 8.
74. Id. art. 20(7), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 8. This last provision could cause jurisdictional difficulties
until interpreted by the reviewing court. It reads:
Regardless of the measures in the preceding paragraphs, when the agreement, the abuse of a dominant position,
or the concentration regards companies operating in sectors subjected to the supervision of more than one authority,
each one may adopt the measures belonging to its competence.
75. Id. art. 20(2), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 8.
76. Id. art. 27(1), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 9.
77. Id. art. 27(2), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 9.
78. Id. art. 27(3), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 9.
79. Id. art. 27(4), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 9.
80. Id. art. 27(5), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 9.
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percent of another credit entity unless this is achieved through a voting trust and
it does not constitute a majority in the second entity.81 All previously existing
holdings of more than 1 percent of a credit entity must be reported when the law
goes into effect, and all holdings of more than 5 percent will be approved if the
Bank of Italy does not respond within 180 days of notice. 82 The Bank of Italy
may also block Member State entities from gaining control of a credit institution
unless adequate safeguards are made to ensure the latter's independence.
83
Authorization of a purchase of control is granted if the Bank of Italy does not
respond within 90 days, 84 and may always be suspended, revoked, or reinforced
to carry out previous agreements on the granting, ceding, or modification of
control .85 The Interministerial Committee for Credit and Savings will promulgate
rules for the concession, suspension, and revocation of authorization, on the
constitution of a voting trust, on a definition of "dominant position" as it applies
to credit entities, and on the formalities of a "protocol of autonomy" to be
signed by all applications for authorization. 86 The Interministerial Committee for
Credit and Savings will also issue instructions for the elimination of conflicts of
interest between credit entities and their relevant shareholders.87
Purchased shares may not be voted until the transaction or activity is ap-
proved, although they may be used to hold the regular shareholders' meeting.
88
If credit entities do not alienate any controlling or 15 percent holdings they have
in other credit entities within six months of the Bank of Italy's review, the court
will order their sale by a public agent. 89 Appeals from administrative regulations
issued under this law will be taken to the regional administrative court of Lazio,
and will be under the exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative judge. 90
Because at least four different agencies, including the Authority and the agen-
cies regulating credit institutions, broadcasting, and publishing, will have juris-
diction over antitrust cases, the antitrust law could become subject to different
meanings, or at least differences in procedure, within the Italian Government.
Because each of these agencies will retain an indeterminate portion of its juris-
diction, conflicts may also arise during a single case. It is difficult to predict the
extent of these intragovemmental differences. However, the agencies' reviewing
court should eventually be able to iron out any differences that prevent effective
administration of the statute.
81. Id. art. 27(6), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 9.
82. Id. art. 27(7), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 10.
83. Id. art. 27(8), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 10.
84. Id. art. 28(1), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 10.
85. Id. art. 28(2), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 10.
86. Id. art. 28(4), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 10.
87. Id. art. 30(3), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 11.
88. Id. art. 29(1), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 11.
89. Id. art. 29(2), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 11.
90. Id. art. 33(1), 240 Gazz. Uff. at 11.
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III. Conclusion
The Italian antitrust law will remain closely tied to the law of the European
Community, but will also differ from the latter. First, Italy will use "interna-
tional competitiveness" as a factor in weighing whether an exemption should be
granted for an agreement that restricts competition. Although this factor is also
considered in the Commission's analyses of mergers, its specific inclusion in
Italy's principal antitrust law ensures that international competition will have
significant weight in the Authority's decision making, and may possibly move
market definition from the national toward the international. Second, unlike the
Treaty of Rome, the Italian law does not list "concerted practices" as a type of
agreement that could restrict competition, and also requires that all agreements
affecting competition do so in a "consistent manner." This not only excludes
from regulation informal market control, but could mean that, also in practice,
the Authority will not investigate temporary restraints, even if their impact on
competition is significant. Third, the Merger Regulation allows shares held by
financial institutions to be voted (for limited purposes) although they will not be
counted toward constituting control. Because the Italian law does not allow such
shares to be voted, only companies large enough to invoke Community juris-
diction will be able to vote shares in this situation.
Each of these differences is significant, and each could determine the outcome
of a given case, but the majority of the Italian law is essentially constructed with
European Community principles. For this reason, the introduction of this new
law to what could be an unruly Italian economy will have the advantage of a
detailed and well-crafted body of law and precedent to help administrators,
management, and attorneys through the early years of its application.
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